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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood"
and L. Whit Carmon IP"
I. INTRODUCTION

Following the adjustments to Georgia's Evidence Code on January 1,
2013, Georgia courts have developed significant case law interpreting
various changes from the old code.' This year's survey period marks the
fourth year since the landmark alterations to the Georgia Evidence Code,
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) Title 242 took effect.
Addressed in this year's Article are cases spanning from June 1, 2016 to
May 31, 2017.3 Specifically, this Article addresses the following: (1)
Significant developments regarding the admissibility of evidence
ascertained by or maintained through technology; (2) Special rules of
admissibility tied to crimes of sexual misconduct or prior violent bad acts;
and (3) Exercises of the exemptions to the hearsay rule.

*Founding Partner in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1984). Member, Mercer Law
Review (1982-1984); Student Writing Editor (1983-1984). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
-Of Counsel in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former Reporter of
Decisions for the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals. Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
~Associate in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., 2013); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, Mercer Law
Review (2014-2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 52 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 24).
2. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2013).
3. For an analysis of evidence during the prior survey period, see John E. Hall, Jr.,
W. Scott Henwood & Jacque Smith Clarke, Evidence, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 67
MERCER L. REV. 63 (2016). Special thanks to Will Story for his research assistance with
this year's Article.
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II. TECHNOLOGY

In the era of continuous self-documentation, the advent of everadvancing, smaller, increasingly more user-friendly recording devices
has given rise to large gaps in the law. There is an enormous need for
legal authority interpreting the use and admissibility of recorded
statements, events, and circumstantial evidence procured by or
maintained through contemporary technology. In this survey period,
Georgia courts addressed several pertinent points of law regarding the
intersection of evidence and technology.
A. Authentication of Evidence Maintained as Video Recording
In State v. Smith,4 the defendant sought to exclude a video recording
of his statement in a pretrial motion. In the hearing on the motion, an
investigator acknowledged the disc housing the alleged statement had no
identifying markers on it that would confirm it was the video taken on
the day of the crime, and further testified he was not present when the
disc in question was created. In addressing the authentication of the
video, the Decatur County Superior County stated, "[T]he State must
show [the recording] is a fair representation of the statement, and may
authenticate the recording by any witness familiar with the subject
depicted on the recording, as is the case with any other video recording
presented as evidence at a criminal trial."5 The Georgia Supreme Court

upheld the trial court's decision to exclude the video recording of the
defendant's confession because, "Given the equivocal testimony of the
investigator with respect to whether the video disc being offered into
evidence was one he had reviewed, the State failed to carry its burden of
proving the video recording was a fair representation of defendant's
interview." 6
B. Necessity of PreservingAll Components of Recorded Video Evidence
In State v. Hall,7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the State
failed to prove a cell phone video contradicted a defendant police officer's
version of the events such that it did not resolve a conflict in evidence
where the video contained no audio recording component of the incident
in question. 8 Hall, a Clayton County police officer, was indicted for simple
battery based on his use of force during an encounter with a homeowner

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

299 Ga. 901, 792 S.E.2d 677 (2016).
Id. at 903, 792 S.E.2d at 678.
Id. at 903, 792 S.E.2d at 678-79.
339 Ga. App. 237, 793 S.E.2d 522 (2016).
Id. at 245, 793 S.E.2d at 528.
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whom he believed might be a burglar. At trial, Hall filed a motion seeking
immunity from prosecution under O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2,9 wherein he
argued that "his use of force was reasonable and justified in light of the
homeowner's resistance to being handcuffed and detained."10 After an
evidentiary hearing that included witness testimony and cell phone video
footage of most of the incident, the trial court granted Hall's motion for
immunity. Subsequently, the State appealed."
On appeal from the trial court's grant of denial of immunity under
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2, the court of appeals viewed the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's ruling. 12 The immunity statute in
question provides law enforcement with immunity if the officer's conduct
is justified. 13 The statute states that, "A person is justified in threatening
or using force against another when and to the extent that he or she
reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to defend
himself or herself or a third person against such other's imminent use of
unlawful force." 14
The court of appeals held that the State's argument that the suspect
did not resist was not supported by the footage contained on the cell
phone. 15 Additionally, as there was no audio component included in the
video, the evidence did not resolve the conflicting testimony regarding
whether the suspect was argumentative and belligerent towards Hall
and the other officers, nor did the video resolve the conflicting testimony
whether the defendant requested that the suspect put his arms behind
his back before the suspect was handcuffed. 16
This case clearly illustrates the importance of preserving all facets of
multimedia recordings, and demonstrates that Georgia courts will take
a multi-layered approach to reviewing such recordings. Here, as
demonstrated in Judge Peterson's concurrence, the court demonstrates
the importance of preserving a complete audio-visual file:

.

The video [was] not clear enough for [the Court] to determine with
confidence which disputed set of facts are true. If it was, [the Court]
would owe no deference to the trial court's factual findings . .
regardless of whether they were based in part on resolving conflicting
witness testimony. But [the Court does] owe deference [in this case]
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2 (2017).
Hall, 339 Ga. App. at 245, 793 S.E.2d at 528.
Id. at 237-38, 793 S.E.2d at 523.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-24.2.
O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21 (2017).
See Hall, 339 Ga. App. at 245, 793 S.E.2d at 528.
Id.
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because the video alone does not resolve the factual dispute, and the
trial court had to resolve conflicting witness testimony to decide the
matter.17
Obviously, the Georgia Court of Appeals recognizes the powerful
impact that contemporaneous cell phone recordings have on
circumstances such as this where there is a "central factual dispute" and
only conflicting witness testimony available to resolve it.18 However, as
this case also demonstrates, where a multimedia recording does not
capture every element of the event in question, courts are less likely to
defer to the recording over other available evidence.' 9
C. Recorded Phone Call Does Not Violate Sixth Amendment Right of
Confrontation
In Jones v. State,20 the defendant was convicted of possessing a
controlled substance outside of its original container, trafficking in
heroin, and possessing heroin with the intent to distribute. The
defendant argued that the trial court erred in permitting the State to
play a recording of a monitored phone call between an informant and
Jones when the informant did not testify at trial. The Clarke County
Superior Court admitted the recording because it found the informant's
statements were admissible to provide context for the defendant's
responses to the informant's statements and were not admitted to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. As for the defendant's own statements,
the trial court determined those were admissible as admissions of a party
opponent. 2 1 The court of appeals cited United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit precedent that "statements offered by a nontestifying speaker are not hearsay and do not violate the Confrontation
Clause when the statements are 'not offered for their truth, but only to
place ... [the defendant's] statements in context.' 22 Thus, the trial court
did not err in admitting the recording. 23

17. Id. at 245-46, 793 S.E.2d at 528-29 (Peterson, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 245, 793 S.E.2d at 528; see Vergara v. State, 283 Ga. 175, 178, 657 S.E.2d
863, 867 (2008) ("where controlling facts are not in dispute, . . . such as those facts
discernible from a videotape, our review is de novo").
19. See Hall, 339 Ga. App. at 245-46, 793 S.E.2d at 528-29.
20. 339 Ga. App. 95, 791 S.E.2d 625 (2016).
21. Id. at 102, 791 S.E.2d at 632.
22. Id. (quoting United States v. Makarenkov, 401 Fed. App'x 442, 445 (11th Cir.
2010)).
23. Id. at 103, 791 S.E.2d at 632; see also United States v. Taylor, No. 16-10638, 2017
U.S. App. LEXIS 7990 (11th Cir. May 5,2017) (holding a district court's admission of muted
video clip recording of an alleged illegal drug transaction between defendant and the
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III. ADMISSION OF PRIOR BAD ACTS EVIDENCE-SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Georgia law has demonstrated, time and again, that crimes linked to
domestic abuse and sexual violence receive close attention by the courts.
This survey period illustrated several instances wherein the special rules
that apply to the admissibility of evidence in these types of cases resulted
in admission of evidence that might have otherwise been excluded. It
bears emphasizing that the primary motivation for these special
evidentiary rules is a clear public policy in favor of preventing these types
of particularly heinous offenses.
A. Domestic Violence-Admission of PriorBad Acts as Evidence of
Motive
In Harris v. State,24 the defendant was convicted of family violence
battery under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f)(2). 25 The defendant appealed,
arguing the Newton County Superior Court improperly admitted
evidence of his prior convictions for family violence battery and simple
battery. Here, the defendant was alleged to have physically abused his
girlfriend's aunt's twenty-year-old daughter because she allegedly
refused his sexual advances. The prior conviction in question occurred
when the defendant was found guilty of another act of family violence
battery and a simple battery in 2009 against his estranged wife and her
sister. 26

The State averred that the evidence was permissible to show motive,
specifically that the defendant uses physical violence to control women
who have denied him something he desires. 27 Even though motive was
not an element of the charged offense, the Georgia Court of Appeals
upheld the admission because,
the other acts evidence was relevant to shed light on why Harris
reacted as he did when the victim did not acquiesce to his sexual
advances. . . . Accordingly, the evidence was relevant for the
permissible purpose of showing the impetus behind [the defendant's]

confidential informant did not violate the Confrontation Clause because, even if muted
video could be deemed testimonial for confrontation purposes, the video was not offered for
its truth, but only to place the investigation and the footage of defendant in context).
24. 338 Ga. App. 778, 792 S.E.2d 409 (2016).
25. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(f)(2) (2012). This code section was amended in 2016 by Senate
Bill 193. Ga. S. Bill 193, Reg. Sess., 2016 Ga. Laws 518 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A.
§ 16-5-23.1 (2017)).
26. Harris, 338 Ga. App. at 778-79, 792 S.E.2d at 410-11.
27. Id. at 779, 792 S.E.2d at 411.
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action of punching the victim in the face when she did not willingly
agree to be his sexual partner. 28
In Smart v. State,29 the defendant was convicted of malice murder and
related offenses in connection with the beating of his wife. The defendant
argued the Chatham County Superior Court erred in allowing the
defendant's ex-wife's sister, Katie Tucker, to testify about the
relationship the defendant had with his ex-wife and the abuse his ex-wife
30
suffered during the course of their relationship. The Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's admission of the testimony because,
although Tucker's testimony referenced specific acts of domestic violence,
31
"her testimony also revealed the impetus behind that violence: control."
In balancing that evidence under the Federal Rule of Evidence 40332
test, the court held, "Tucker's testimony was not elicited merely to show
that Appellant had engaged in prior acts of domestic violence, but,
instead, it demonstrated that the violence was a mechanism for control
of his intimate partners," 33 thus affirming the trial court's decision to
allow Tucker's testimony. 34 Clearly, this is a very nuanced interpretation
of the prohibition against admitting evidence of a person's "character or
a trait of character [that] shall not be admissible for the purpose of
3
proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion." 5
The court explained that the evidence in question was not admitted to
show that the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait (a
propensity for domestic violence) but was, rather, admitted to show a
36
reoccurring motive for committing similar acts of violence. Parsing the
difference between allowing the evidence to show "motive" as opposed to
withholding it where it only demonstrates the propensity to act in
conformity is no easy task. One can attempt to distinguish the two on the
basis that motive involves a seemingly conscious acknowledgment of a
pattern of behavior by the actor whereas the prohibition against
"propensity evidence" seeks to avoid admitting evidence that allows
jurors to consider evidence that suggests an individual was unconsciously
37
predisposed to certain bad acts based on a pattern of previous behavior.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 781, 792 S.E.2d at 413.
299 Ga. 414, 788 S.E.2d 442 (2016).
Id. at 416, 788 S.E.2d at 446.
Id. at 418, 788 S.E.2d at 447.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Smart, 299 Ga. at 419, 788 S.E.2d at 448.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(a) (2017).
Smart, 299 Ga. at 418, 788 S.E.2d at 447.
Id. at 417-18, 778 S.E.2d at 447.
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There is a fairly apparent similar policy motivation for admitting
evidence of prior acts of family violence and admitting prior acts of sexual
violence-both attempt to protect a distinct class of particularly
vulnerable individuals. In any event, this survey period's case law lends
further support to those who seek a finessed method of admitting what
otherwise might be considered inadmissible "propensity evidence" under
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404.38
For perspective, compare the above holdings to Parks v. State,39 where
the defendant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder,
aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a felony. Thereafter, the defendant appealed his conviction on the basis
that his prior 1990 conviction for aggravated assault should have been
inadmissible. 40 After noting that the Georgia Supreme Court has adopted
the Eleventh Circuit's three-part test for admissibility under
Rule 404(b)41 along with the balancing test under Rule 403,42 the court
held the trial court erred when it admitted the defendant's 1990
conviction. 43 The 1990 conviction stemmed from the defendant pleading
guilty to an aggravated assault charge where he participated in a
shooting that occurred in the parking lot of an apartment complex using
a 9mm handgun. The State contended this evidence was admissible to
show motive, intent, knowledge, identity, and the absence of mistake or
accident. 44 The supreme court rejected these contentions, holding the
defendant's knowledge was not at issue where the defense was
justification, and that the defendant had made no claim that he
accidentally or mistakenly shot the victim.45

Furthermore, the Rule 404(b) evidence consisted of testimony from two
victims who stated that they were shot during the incident in 1990, which
involved a dispute over drugs and money; the investigating officer's
testimony that defendant and one other person were the main shooters
during the 1990 incident; and a certified copy of the conviction which
showed that the defendant pled guilty to the crime. 46 As such, the court
38. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404 (2017). CompareHarris, 338 Ga. App. 778, 792 S.E.2d 409 and
Smart, 299 Ga. 414, 788 S.E.2d 445 with Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303, 794 S.E.2d 623 (2016)
(holding evidence not admissible to show motive and modus operandi where crime involved
murder and violence but not domestic abuse or sexual violence).
39. 300 Ga. 303, 794 S.E.2d 623 (2016).
40. Id. at 306, 794 S.E.2d at 627.
41. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
42. FED. R. EVID. 403.
43. Parks, 300 Ga. at 305-06, 794 S.E.2d at 627-28.
44. Id. at 306, 794 S.E.2d at 627.
45. Id. at 306, 794 S.E.2d at 628.
46. Id.
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also rejected the State's argument that the evidence presented was used
to prove identity and motive, holding that identity and motive were
inapplicable. 47 In conclusion, the court held the evidence had no purpose
other than to show the appellant's propensity towards violence; therefore,
the admission of evidence of the other acts under the circumstances
constituted an error.48 Here, however, the error was harmless where the
defendant had opened fire eighteen times and was relying on the claim
of self-defense. 49
B. Similar TransactionEvidence of PriorActs of Child Molestation
(O.C.G.A. § 24-4-414(a) and O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413(a))
In State v. McPherson,50 the State appealed from an order excluding
similar transaction evidence of prior acts of child molestation allegedly
committed by the defendant. The similar transaction in dispute involved
a separate alleged victim who contacted law enforcement after the
current child molestation charges came to light, alleging the defendant
had also molested him when he was in elementary school. The charges
the defendant faced included child molestation. 51 The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to exclude evidence of the
similar transaction, holding, "[g]iven the express direction that evidence
of prior sexual offenses committed by the defendant 'shall be admissible,'
OCGA § 24-4-414(a) and two related statutes, OCGA §§ 24-4-413(a) and
24-4-415(a), have been construed as creating 'a rule of inclusion, with a
strong presumption in favor of admissibility."' 52 Furthermore, the court
stressed that evidence admitted under these provisions is not subject to
the limits of O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b),53 but instead may be considered for
any matter to which it is relevant, including whether the evidence
demonstrates that the defendant had a propensity to engage in certain
sexual offenses. 54 The court of appeals also noted the fact that the prior
acts were committed thirty-five years prior to the incident in question did
not necessitate exclusion where there had been no showing that the

47. Id.
48. Id. at 308, 794 S.E.2d at 628.
49. Id. at 308, 794 S.E.2d at 628-29.
50. 341 Ga. App. 871, 800 S.E.2d 389 (2017).
51. Id. at 871, 800 S.E.2d at 390.
52. Id. at 873, 800 S.E.2d at 391-92 (quoting Steele v. State, 337 Ga. App. 562, 566,
788 S.E.2d 145, 149 (2016)).
53. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) (2017).
54. McPherson, 341 Ga. App. at 873, 800 S.E.2d at 392.
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potential witness' memory as to the alleged incidents had become
impaired or was otherwise patently unreliable.5 5
In Dixon v. State,56 the defendant appealed his convictions of child
molestation alleging the Fulton County Superior Court erred in
admitting evidence qualifying as "another offense of sexual assault"
under O.C.G.A. § 24-4-41357 or, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 24-4-414,58
"another offense of child molestation."5 9 The court held the State's need
for this evidence was great based upon the defendant's attacks on the
victim's credibility, the lack of any physical evidence, and the delayed
nature of the victim's outcry.60 Each of defendant's past acts involved
inappropriate sexual contact between the defendant and children, all of
whom were of a similar age to the victim in the case at bar, which the
defendant gained access to through a relationship with the child's
mother. 61 The fact that the victims were different genders was irrelevant
for the court's determination because, as the court explained, "[t]he
sexual abuse of young children, regardless of the sex of the victims or the
nomenclature or type of acts or other conduct perpetrated upon them, is
of sufficient similarity to make the evidence admissible." 62 This is due to
the fact that "sex crimes against children require a unique bent of
mind." 63 The court noted here, as in McPherson, the passing of time (in
this case seven to thirteen years) between the molestation of the previous
victims and current victim did not mandate a prejudicial finding under
the balancing test in O.C.G.A. § 24-4-403.64
In Kritlow v. State,65 after the defendant was convicted of aggravated
sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, aggravated assault, false
imprisonment, and sexual battery, the defendant appealed the admission
of evidence of his prior sex offenses. 66 The State sought to introduce
evidence of prior sex crimes for purposes of showing the defendant's
intent and lustful disposition.67 In this case, the Catoosa County Superior
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
at 394.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 876, 800 S.E.2d at 394.
341 Ga. App. 255, 800 S.E.2d 11 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-414 (2017).
341 Ga. App. at 255, 800 S.E.2d at 13.
Id. at 262, 800 S.E.2d at 17.
Id.

Id.
Id. (quoting Gunn v. State, 300 Ga. App. 229, 232, 684 S.E.2d 380, 383 (2009)).
Id. at 262, 800 S.E.2d at 17; see also McPherson, 341 Ga. App. at 876, 800 S.E.2d
339 Ga. App. 353, 793 S.E.2d 560 (2016).
Id. at 353, 793 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 355, 793 S.E.2d at 563.
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Court held that the provisions of O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413(a) supersede the
provisions of O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404(b) for the admission of propensity
evidence in sexual assault cases. 68 Furthermore, the court found the
evidence that the defendant had committed similar sexual assaults was
relevant as it,
had the tendency to bolster the credibility of the victim by
demonstrating that her circumstances were not unique. Indeed, it had
the tendency to disprove a claim of fabrication by showing that
[Kritlow] preyed on women in the victim's . . circumstance [of being
in a place where Kritlow could force them into a smaller room and bar
a door preventing escape]. Thus, the evidence satisfied OCGA
§ 24-4-413's relevance threshold.69
Similarly, in Taylor v. State, 70 the defendant was convicted of two
counts of child molestation, two counts of aggravated child molestation,
two counts of statutory rape, one count of rape, and one count of
influencing a witness. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court
erred by allowing testimony about an allegedly similar transaction
because there were no similarities between the testimony and the acts
alleged by the victims. 7 1 As a general rule, the sexual molestation of

young children or teenagers, regardless of the type of act, is sufficiently
similar to be admissible as similar transaction evidence. 72 In Taylor, the
defendant's sister testified about an incident that occurred when she was
nine or ten where defendant had her and her cousins play "mommies and
daddies," a game that involved "sexual contact," like "touching and
feeling," kissing on the mouth and touching private parts. 73
The State argued the testimony was admissible because it tended to
show the defendant's lustful disposition toward young girls.7 4 Even
though the defendant only touched his sister's arm during that game, the
evidence was still admissible, despite it occurring fifteen years prior to
the crime at issue: "Where, as here, the similar transaction evidence is
otherwise admissible, a time lapse such as this one goes to the weight
and credibility of the evidence and does not demand its exclusion." 75

-

68. Id.
69. Id. at 356, 793 S.E.2d at 563 (alteration in the original) (quoting Marlow v. State,
337 Ga. App. 1, 4, 785 S.E.2d 583, 586 (2016)).
70. 339 Ga. App. 321, 793 S.E.2d 198 (2016).
71. Id. at 321-23, 793 S.E.2d at 199-200.
72. Id. at 323, 793 S.E.2d at 200.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 323-24, 793 S.E.2d at 200; see also United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.3d 1345
(11th Cir. 2017) (holding evidence of defendant's prior interactions with two minors, whom
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IV. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
Courts during this survey period provided further guidance regarding
two important exceptions to the hearsay rule: the excited utterance
exception as well as the residual exception. Further, the courts also shed
light on an important distinction regarding the exception for party
admissions as they relate to admissions made through text messages.
A. Excited Utterances
In Akintoye v. State,76 the defendant was convicted of theft by taking,
theft by deception, exploitation of an elder person, violation of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and money
laundering.7 7 The defendant contended the trial court erred in admitting
the victim's grandson's testimony on the ground that it constituted
inadmissible hearsay.78 In Akintoye, the evidence showed the victim
made the statements in question to his grandson immediately after
learning that he had been scammed into wiring more than six thousand
dollars into a bank account by a man who falsely posed as his grandson,
and when the victim made the statements, he was confused and very
distraught.7 9 The court found that "[u]nder the totality of the
circumstances, these statements were made under the stress of
excitement caused by a startling event and the statements related to the
startling event," and thus upheld the admissibility of the testimony of
the grandson under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.80
B. Residual Exception
Aside from admitting the testimony under the excited utterance
exception, the court in Akintoye also admitted the evidence under the
residual exception to the hearsay rule.81 Again, the defendant in this
action contended that the victim's grandson's testimony was

the defendant drove to meet clients for prostitution and later discovered to be minors was
admissible as other acts evidence, in prosecution of the defendant for sex trafficking of a
minor; the evidence was highly probative as the charged offense and defendant's
interactions with two minors were close both in nature and in time, the nature of evidence
was no more inflammatory or emotionally charged than the crime for which defendant was
tried, furthermore, the district court provided two limiting instructions at trial, and as a
result, the risk of prejudice was minimized).
76. 340 Ga. App. 777, 798 S.E.2d 720 (2017).
77. Id. at 777, 798 S.E.2d at 722-23.
78. Id. at 785, 798 S.E.2d at 727.
79. Id. at 786, 798 S.E.2d at 727.
80. Id. at 786, 798 S.E.2d at 727-28.
81. Id. at 786, 798 S.E.2d at 728.
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inadmissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. 82 After

setting forth the residual exception statute, the court cited six
requirements for admitting evidence under the residual hearsay rule:
(1) The hearsay declarant is unavailable as a witness; (2) The
statement is evidence of a material fact; (3) No comparable evidence is
available to the proponent through reasonable efforts; (4) The
statement shows circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (5)
The proponent provides pre-trial notice of intent to offer the statement
under this exception; and, (6) The general purposes of the rules of
evidence and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. 83
As applied to Akintoye, the declarant was no longer living (thus
making him unavailable) and his statements to his grandson provided
evidence of a material fact-that he wired money under false pretenses.
The circumstances surrounding the statements provided sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness given the close relationship between the
victim and his grandson. The State gave notice of its intent to offer the
grandson's statements before trial, and the general purposes of the
evidence rules and interests of justice were best served by admitting the
grandson's statements because, otherwise, the State could not prosecute
the crime. 84 Finally, the court held that the grandson's statements were
more probative than any other available evidence as the State had no
other evidence to demonstrate why the victim transferred the funds into
the defendant's account. 85 Therefore, the court held that the grandson's
testimony regarding the victim's statements was admissible under the
86
residual exception to the hearsay rule.

The courts in this survey period have also provided litigators with
evidence of statements that fall outside the residual exception. In Wilson
v. State, 87 the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that, where a defendant
could not affirmatively show that excluding a certain witness's statement
probably affected the outcome of trial, given the overwhelming evidence
of guilt, the trial court properly excluded the statement. 8 Following the
partial denial of his motion for new trial, the defendant appealed his
convictions and sentences for malice murder and other crimes in

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 786, 798 S.E.2d at 727.
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connection with the robbery of Cassandra James in November 2009 and
her fatal stabbing the following December. The defendant's sole charge
was that the trial court erroneously excluded an out-of-court declaration
that would ostensibly explain why his footprint was found on the victim's
door shortly before she was found murdered inside her apartment.89 In
its opening statement at trial, the defense counsel informed the jury that
it would hear from the victim's property manager who would testify that,
a few days prior to her death, she reported an incident to him when
someone allegedly kicked in her door.9 0
Following opening statements, the State raised an objection to the
anticipated statements, arguing that its admissibility would have to be
considered, if at all, under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. 91
As the trial progressed, the State informed the trial court that the
manager had been contacted, and the State took the position that the
alleged statement by the victim would be inadmissible under the residual
exception to the hearsay rule. The statement failed to meet the
requirement of trustworthiness or reliability because the victim and the
property manager hardly knew each other, and the manager denied that
the victim ever notified him that her apartment door had been kicked
in.92 The court reiterated the principal that the exception is one which is
"to be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances .

.

. when

certain exceptional guarantees of trustworthiness exist and when high
degrees of probativeness and necessity are present." 93 Furthermore, the
court went on to emphasize that,
Such guarantees must be equivalent to cross-examined former
testimony, statements under a belief of impending death, statements
against interest, and statements of personal or family history. These
categories of hearsay have attributes of trustworthiness not possessed
by the general run of hearsay statements that tip the balance in favor
of introducing the information if the declarant is unavailable to testify.
And they are all considered sufficiently trustworthy not because of the
credibility of the witness reporting them in court, but because of the
circumstances under which they were originally made.94
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Id. at 83, 799 S.E.2d at 758.
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Wilson, 301 Ga. at 87, 799 S.E.2d at 761.
Id. at 89, 799 S.E.2d at 762.
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Clearly, this was not an instance where such guarantees were metgiven the witness who was alleged to have witnessed the statement in
question denied that the statement had ever been made.9 5

C. Differences in Incoming and Outgoing Text Messages for Purposes of
Meeting the Hearsay Exception of an Admission by a Party
Opponent
In Glispie v. State, 96 the defendant was convicted of violating the
Georgia Controlled Substance Act9 7 for possession with intent to
distribute drugs, obstruction of a law enforcement officer, fleeing and
attempting to elude, failure to stop at a stop sign, and driving an unsafe
or improperly equipped vehicle.98 The case was appealed to the Georgia
Court of Appeals, and Judge Doyle authored an opinion on the matter.99
Thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two
questions:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that text messages sent
to the cell phone found in [defendant's] possession were admissible as
party admissions? (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in concluding that
the trial court did not err in denying [defendant's] motion in limine to
exclude the text messages?100
The text messages in question were extracted from the defendant's cell
phone and reflected several conversations between the defendant and
potential drug buyers. Both at trial and in the defendant's appeal to the
court of appeals, the defendant contended that all of the text messages
from his cell phone constituted inadmissible hearsay. 101 The court
clarified that,
An admission is a statement offered against a party which is ... [t]he
party's own statement . . . Therefore, the outgoing text messages on
the cell phone may be considered [defendant's] own statements, as the
facts of this case indicate that [defendant] sent the messages. The

95. Id. at 87, 799 S.E.2d at 761.
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incoming text messages, however, are not statements by [defendant].
As such, they do not fall under this hearsay exception. 102
Therefore, where there is a sufficient argument as to the authenticity
of the author of the text messages sent, there is precedent to admit
correspondence sent from any number of different modes of electronic
03
media under the hearsay exception for party admissions.1
D. Solicitation of Evidence that Opens the Door for Hearsay Exceptions
Prevents Subsequent Claims of ErrorBased on the Admissibility of
the Testimony in Question
In Adkins v. State, 104 the defendant was convicted of felony murder,
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, aggravated
assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and was
subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction stemmed
from the murder of Frederick Early and the non-fatal shootings of Briona
Moore and Pamphylia Baynes.105
On the date in question, Briona Moore and Pamphylia Baynes
attempted to take a bus so Baynes could retrieve her disability check.
They met Early, also known as "Smurf," who had agreed to give Moore
money for bus fare. The three talked for about ten minutes on a street
corner before a car drove by and a passenger opened fire on the group.
Baynes and Moore were shot but survived. Early died of multiple gunshot

wounds.

106

When interviewed while at the hospital after the shooting, neither
Moore nor Baynes could identify the shooter by name. Moore added that
the shooter was wearing a ski mask that encumbered her ability to
identify the individual. Yet, at trial, both Baynes and Moore identified
Adkins as the shooter. Rosalee Smith, another eyewitness to the
shooting, together with Moore, testified that Adkins went by the name
"Fly Monkey"; further, Baynes testified that Adkins went by the alias

"Fly."107
On cross-examination, Baynes testified that she heard Early say, "Fly,
Fly, Fly," after he was shot just before his death. Adkins claimed this was
a case of mistaken identity, and his counsel stressed in closing argument
that there was no physical evidence linking Adkins to the shootings and
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emphasized the inconsistent statements of both Baynes and Moore.
Nevertheless, the jury found Adkins guilty on all counts. 108
On appeal, Adkins argued that the trial court erred by permitting the
State to introduce Early's purported dying declaration in exception to the
hearsay rule. 109 The court of appeals held that Adkins could not obtain
reversal on this basis because his counsel elicited the testimony in
question. 110 In so holding, the court made it clear that,
The State argues that any error in the admission of Early's statement
through Baynes's testimony was induced, as the testimony was elicited
by defense counsel. A defendant generally cannot complain on appeal
about the admission of evidence that he introduced himself, even when
he does so after the trial court has overruled his objection to the
admissibility of that evidence.111
The court's ruling places defense counsel in a difficult position when
deciding on how to proceed where there are serious concerns regarding
the admissibility of certain testimony that is unsolicited from opposing
counsel but is, all the same, placed in front of the jury and is damaging
to the defense. Essentially, the defendant's counsel must choose one of
two tactics. First, the defense can take the approach of "getting in front
of the testimony" by attacking it on cross and, thus, risk losing the ability
to appeal the admission of the evidence. Second, counsel can choose to try
and re-direct the case to de-emphasize the importance of the testimony
at issue in hopes of subsequently attacking the admission of the evidence
on appeal. As such, Adkins demonstrates that there is significant value
to the prosecution leading a witness to recognize the value in certain
testimony and get them to offer it at trial without any solicitation on the
State's part.
V. CONCLUSION

This year's survey period produced a wide variety of decisions that
lend support to litigators who continue to adjust to the influence of the
federal rules following the changes made in 2013. Certainly, this period
continues to provide greater guidance for some of evidence law's most
nuanced and nascent areas.
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